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Secretary Resor Reviews SEA Situation

Vietnamization Paramount Objective For Peace

Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor outlined the situation in Southeast Asia to members of the Chicago Chapter, Military Order of World Wars, pointing out, "This is a complicated war. Whether our initial involvement was wise or correct is not the issue today. We must deal with the situation as it exists."

Noting that "we will continue to seek a negotiated peace in Paris," Secretary Resor added, "But if a negotiated peace cannot be achieved, we have an alternate route to ending the American combat role." That is Vietnamization (a component of the President's program for peace.)

Secretary Resor said, "Vietnamization is a companion to our diplomatic efforts. For the Army, it is now the paramount objective in Southeast Asia."

Secretary Resor pointed out that it is U.S. policy "to assure the South Vietnamese a reasonable opportunity to develop a viable government and a capacity to stand on their own."

(The first of a two-part series of Secretary Resor's address on Page Six.)

Strength (Or Weakness) Of This Nation Credited To Young Americans In Uniform

The young American in uniform "is the strength of this nation, or the weakness. He is our Armed Forces," the commandant told members of the Military Order of the World Wars.

General Leonard F. Chapman Jr., compared today's member of the Armed Forces with the fighting man of the world wars.

His talk included student dissent, the generation gap, American education, and racial and economic strife.

General Chapman noted that the true, young individualist is found in the quiet majority of this generation. The young man who chooses to serve.

. . . In spite of the popular negativism of today, the *American Dream* still exists. And it finds no greater substance than in the dedication and sacrifice of the young American fighting man.

General Chapman

(Additional comments by General Chapman on Page Seven.)

Dr. Foster Outlines Solutions To Counter Technological Problems

The Director of Defense Research and Engineering has outlined the necessary solutions to meet the challenge facing this country in the technological field.

Speaking at the Air Force Materials Symposium in Miami Beach, Fla., Dr. John S. Foster said, "Our collective responsibility is to maintain a strong defense posture for our nation. This is becoming increasingly difficult as the Soviet Union and other technically advanced nations rapidly diminish the technological superiority we once enjoyed. But just as the challenge is growing, our R&D (research and development) and military budgets are declining. This is due to many factors, including competing national priorities but, most important, it is the result of an erosion of public confidence in our ability to design and build reliable military hardware at an acceptable price.

"This is a problem of mutual concern. Those of us in the Department of Defense cannot meet the challenge alone. We must all be part of the solution—just as all of us have been part of the problem."

Dr. Foster emphasized, "We must insist that all the technological work we do is not only economical and effective but also necessary. I don't mean useful or good to have or desirable. I mean necessary. . . ."

(Excerpts from Dr. Foster's speech on Page Two.)

Dr. Foster Outlines Solutions To Counter Technological Problems

(Continued From Page One)

Let's start with the problem. Research, development and production costs are escalating. This is true with materials as it is true with every other element of defense cost. I am particularly interested in materials . . . because the very integrity and honesty of every military weapon depends on the performance of the materials that go into it. And the materials, of course, are no better than the human beings—you people here tonight—make them. Furthermore, the materials must do the job within more restricted defense budgets.

To put it another way, we need improved materials in the weapons, but we must get them at a lower price.

Materials technologists have made significant achievements in the past and will continue to do so in the future. But in the present austere environment, they have to be more responsive and responsible if our weapon systems are to be as effective and economical as they must be.

Changes must be made in the work that you and I are involved in.

First, it is not sufficient for the technologist to look at the price per pound of a new material. He must also understand the cost of design with the new material, of production, inspection, installation, operation, maintenance and replacement costs. This is one of the ways we can get a handle on the over-all cost problem. We must avoid the pitfall of developing new materials whose "cost to use" is out of balance with the rest of the equipment.

Secondly, materials testing has to be emphasized more heavily than before, and we have to do more of it in the early stages of materials development. It is too late and too costly to test the materials after design decisions have been made and they are incorporated in the system.

Finally, we must eliminate three syndromes which have developed over past years: (1) overestimating the true value and underestimating the real cost; (2) getting glued to "fads" at the expense of new or modified conventional materials; and (3) being entranced by sophistication and forgetting the more straightforward approaches. If we abandon those syndromes, we will have made an immeasurable contribution to the problems that face us now.

In the future we must not start engineering development of a new system without having thoroughly tested its new materials. Testing of the materials in all configurations has to be done very early in their development cycle. It might take more time and cost more in the short run, but it will save much more money downstream.

In general, all of us, and you people in particular, must ensure that defense work is genuinely cost-effective.

And I mean real cost, and real effectiveness. In your work, materials, cost can no longer be regarded as the number of dollars per pound. The materials cost which you and the system managers and the decision-makers must consider, is the cost of the material in R&D plus its cost in production, its cost in fabrication, its cost in inspection, in installation, testing, maintenance and in replacement. A total figure is difficult to estimate, but everyone who develops new materials, uses them, manages defense hardware or sets defense policies must learn to think of costs in those total terms.

The same for effectiveness. It is not enough just to be pleased that a new material gives us twice the strength per pound. We must calculate the true effectiveness of the material as it will be used and maintained in combat.

Since defense budgets will be tighter, effectiveness must be a truly impressive gain per unit of cost, or we just can't buy it. Five or 10 per cent better performance for equal cost is interesting, but more often our managers will have to wait until the effective improvement is substantially greater before he can justify using the new material.

Now, I don't want you to have the mistaken impression that all of the burden of adjusting to these new times will fall on those of you who are dedicated to the work of improving defense-related materials. The responsibility to do better exists all up and down the line. Let me tell you some of the steps that we in the Department of Defense are taking to come to grips with the conflicting pressures of the diminishing American technological superiority and restrictive R&D budgets.

First, we have reviewed, and will continue to review, our R&D programs to find dollars which can be saved. The pressures on dollars will increase in the next few years.

Second, action is being taken to achieve tighter programming and even more relevance in our research and technology efforts.

Third, we are modifying the basic philosophy of weapons acquisition, and the processes by which we will procure these weapons. I will talk about each of these in turn. . . .

We are reviewing the various performers in our R&D programs. We cannot jeopardize the future by reducing our support to first-class scientific groups whether they be in-house, industry or universities. So with tighter budgets, we must stop supporting less-productive groups and programs.

We have first examined our own operations. As an example, last year we announced the closing of three in-house laboratories, either because they had become less productive or because the mission for which they were originally established is no longer necessary.

At the same time we are taking steps to increase the involvement of Department of Defense laboratories in systems development problems. There is a tremendous reservoir of knowledge and experience in these laboratories.

Some of our problems exist because in-house expertise has not been used when it should have been. For example, you are aware of a recent system problem which might have been prevented had the concepts of fracture mechanics been used early in the system development. To avoid this sort of shortcoming in the future, we intend to use every resource we have. And we must act as soon as a problem is found—not wait until a problem becomes a crisis.

We have initiated some innovations in management which

we believe will increase the effectiveness of defense R&D. As you know, for the past several years we have been placing more and more emphasis on the Development Concept Paper which must be approved for each major system before a major development is initiated. We have recently introduced an extension of the DCP concept to the technology areas.

We refer to these new papers as Technology Planning Documents. We are experimenting with this concept now, but in the long run we intend that one will be prepared for each technology area. Each document will (a) identify future potential system needs; (b) describe the technology required; (c) analyze whether necessary technology is on hand; (d) describe the various technical approaches which could satisfy the needs; (e) estimate the cost and time of each approach; (f) project the costs of application; (g) set priorities to ensure that we support our most pressing needs.

One of the first of these Technology Planning Documents is on materials. We hope this document will be available soon. It will describe the technical developments that the DoD materials and structures community must achieve in order that our forces will be equipped with the best possible weapons in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It will identify the greatest materials inadequacies in light of future needs, the critical and pacing problems, and the specific milestones.

As an example, we know that our technological capabilities in strategic missiles for the 1975-1980 time period will be constrained by materials and structures technology. Strategic offensive and defensive missiles need more cost-effective materials.

Dr. Foster told members of the American Newspaper Publishers Association in New York April 23:

"Our own strong past research and development efforts have put us in a position many times to understand new developments in Soviet weaponry, as we have discovered them, and have provided us with short-lead-time counters to those developments.

I want to share with you some other examples out of the recent past of Soviet developments and the counters that have been available to us.

The Soviets started to test a multiple warhead for their SS-9 ICBM in August 1968. They are continuing those tests at an accelerated rate.

We know that the triple warhead can be a threat to our Minuteman deterrent force, but we have effective counters to that threat. Our R&D program makes possible a ballistic missile defense, the Safeguard system, which can provide a sufficient margin of protection to our Minuteman fields against that threat. We are researching feasible techniques of limited mobility of the missiles which, if necessary, will make it vastly more difficult for even a much larger number of deployed SS-9s to successfully target our Minuteman force.

SIZE COMPARISON OF U.S. AND SOVIET MAJOR MISSILE SYSTEMS



THREE ROADS TO PEACE—*Part I*

In a recent address before a meeting of Soviet and American citizens, Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson outlined ways in which friction between their two countries might be lessened. He called for "spheres of restraint," regional self-policing, and a strengthened United Nations. This is the first of two parts of excerpts from his address.

It is a privilege to be asked to participate in this extraordinary symposium [the Second National Convocation on the Challenge of Building Peace].

My remarks . . . were composed with an eye both to the unique nature of this audience and the title of your convocation. I seek to focus your concern on the grave hazards to world peace which arise when local conflicts threaten to escalate to the point of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

There are many questions on which the United States and the Soviet Union disagree. We are likely to continue to disagree. There is nothing to be gained by pretending that this is not the case. Despite these differences, we also have areas of common interest. I should like to concentrate . . . on how we can maximize one of those areas of common interest: how we can most effectively insulate ourselves against the escalation of local conflicts. Whatever strengthens and promotes this common interest will also serve the cause of peace. To this end I would like to suggest three simultaneous and complementary forms of action.

Spheres Of Restraint

The first involves acknowledging and developing what I shall refer to as "spheres of restraint"; the second calls for encouraging regional self-policing and the development of regional institutions and capabilities; and the third requires strengthening United Nations mechanisms so that they can more effectively cope with local conflicts.

As I look at the world situation that now seems to be emerging I seen an uneasy equilibrium at the center in which the crucial element is that U.S.-USSR bilateral strategic relationship. In recent years we have both come to recognize the need to give this strategic relationship greater stability.

Significant headway has already been made. Agreements on a partial test ban treaty, the banning of nuclear weapons from Antarctica and from outer space, and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have been followed by a draft treaty barring weapons of mass destruction from the seabed. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks now under way in Vienna have even greater potential for stabilizing our strategic relationship. Extremely sensitive and complex matters touching upon the vital security of each side are at stake.

Beyond this central strategic equilibrium and destined, I believe, to become increasingly important are complex new configurations of power involving other countries and, in some cases, new regional groupings. In some areas of the world the power of the United States is involved in the local balance; in some areas Soviet power is involved; in other regions we are both involved, directly or indirectly.

Certain regions where both of us are now deeply involved are so important to the central configuration of power that accommodations will require a careful process of negotiation on outstanding issues. Central Europe, for which the NATO ministerial meeting recently proposed mutual and balanced force reductions, is the outstanding example.

A Limit To Intervention

In other areas, however, where neither of us is now so heavily committed, progress can be made toward reducing the danger of expanded local conflict by deliberately limiting our involvement. This does not require that we agree on the origin and merits of the conflict in question nor that we forego all interests in the area. What is required is that we do agree—either tacitly or explicitly—to refrain from any action, direct or indirect, which might disturb its internal equilibrium.

Since the world of the 1970s is not likely to be a placid one, this will not be an easy task.

The temptations, the impatience, and the anger which will be stirred by continuing eruptions and violence in developing areas emphasize the need for major power abstention. The development of "spheres of restraint" will require that both major powers recognize that their long-term interests are not furthered by attempts to gain short-term—and often fleeting—advantage.

Each side has its own views as to what constitutes current examples of such attempts. I believe, for instance, that the Soviet Union should realize that any immediate gains it might make by attempting to take advantage of the troubled Middle

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Regional cooperation, as well as regional self-policing, can bring peace and prosperity to Southeast Asia. In a first step, four nations—Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Republic of Vietnam—signed a treaty in 1965 making it possible for electric power to benefit all people in the Mekong River delta. (United Nations Photo)

East situation are far outweighed by the danger of stirring up a wider conflict. When in such an area one of us—in this case the USSR—involves itself militarily, it is inevitable that the other will take notice and react.

We in the United States, meanwhile, must come to terms with the fact that violent upheaval—however repugnant to our preference for orderly and peaceful change—is going to continue to occur. We must realize that in most such situations U.S. power is neither a desirable nor an effective prescription.

Coercion Not Acceptable

In addition to realizing that we have neither a moral right nor a duty to intervene in every local quarrel, both the U.S. and the USSR must also recognize that our power to deal with such disputes is sharply circumscribed by the new confidence and strength of many of the smaller nations. In many cases, to be sure, our participation—together with such leverage as we can usefully exercise—can help the parties find an acceptable formula for a settlement. This is what we are seeking to do in our discussions on the Middle East. But such efforts should not lead us to believe that an imposed solution, even where we can agree on its basic elements, is a lasting solution. Where persuasion fails, coercion is not an acceptable option.

These perceptions are reflected in the way the Nixon Administration is attempting to remold U.S. foreign policy. They can be seen in the more precise manner in which we are now setting the limits of our obligations. As President Nixon has put it, *"We have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around."* Accordingly, we are being more exact in the delineation of those U.S. interests which, when threatened, must call forth a response.

We hope that the Soviet Union is also undertaking a new look at its own real interests around the world to see whether they too might not, to advantage, be defined more narrowly. To the extent it does so, the development of spheres of restraint will become an easier task.

But even if both of us successfully pursue a course faithful to a recognition of spheres of restraint, this may not, in itself, be sufficient to insulate local conflicts and to prevent the risk of escalation. A second form of action, therefore, will also be important—that is, encouraging regional efforts to develop institutions for coping with local problems and disputes.

The Charter of the United Nations—in Articles 33 and 52—clearly envisages regional efforts which can contribute to the preservation of peace.

While experience to date does not suggest that major successes will soon be achieved in this way, the record is not without promise. From the dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua two decades ago to the more recent conflict between El Salvador and Honduras, the Organization of American States has demonstrated a useful capacity for peacemaking. The Organization for African Unity has also scored some success in mediating disputes—as in those between Ethiopia and Somalia and between Morocco and Algeria, both in 1964.

(To Be Continued)

Vietnamization Paramount Objective For Peace

(Continued From Page One)

The recent wave of demonstrations by young people has called into question once more the wisdom of our policy in Southeast Asia. The vast majority of those who have objected are patriotic and sincere. The issues they raise are serious ones which merit serious discussion.

Accordingly, I would like to take time to outline the situation in Southeast Asia as I see it.

At the risk of stating the obvious, let me begin with a caution: *it is essential that the debate proceed on the level of reason, and not emotion. It is vital that men and women of all persuasions show respect for those with whom they disagree.*

For the issues involved are complex. It has been wisely said that the most difficult questions are not conflicts between right and wrong, but between one competing right and another. The great crises with which individuals or nations must deal are seldom free from factual or moral ambiguity. . . .

This is a complicated war. Whether our initial involvement was wise or correct is not the issue today. We must deal with the situation as it exists.

In his State of the Union message President Nixon stated the major immediate goal of our policy. *It is,* he said, *to bring an end to the war in Vietnam and in a way that will secure a just peace. We have not sought, and do not seek, victory in the conventional military sense. This is a war of limited objectives. We seek only to meet our past pledges and give the Vietnamese people a reasonable chance to choose freely and develop their own form of government.*

Some people have argued that we simply should cease combat operations and leave Vietnam at once. The Vietnamese peasant, they say, does not really understand or care what form of central government he lives under anyway.

But that proposal overlooks our moral obligations from having acted. We have every reason to believe that a sudden withdrawal of our forces would be followed, after heavy South Vietnamese casualties, by a North Vietnamese takeover of South Vietnam. The murder of more than 3,000 civilians by the North Vietnamese during their four-week occupation of Hue in 1968 suggests that the bloodshed would not stop. Moreover, even if one were to ignore the aspirations of those individuals forming the base of Vietnamese society, what of the class of teachers, village leaders and government officials? These groups have relied on our pledges. To them the promise of self-determination does have meaning. We have an obligation to give them a fair chance to build a self-sustaining nation. We would undermine that chance by a sudden withdrawal.

Does this then mean that we must stay in Vietnam forever? No, and that is not our plan. But the Republic of Vietnam is under external attack from North Vietnam. Under these circumstances we do believe that it is wise and in our national interest to help assure the Government of South Vietnam a reasonable chance to provide within a reasonable time for its own security.

We have a two-pronged plan to help achieve this security for South Vietnam while ending the American combat role.

First of all, we continue to seek a negotiated peace in Paris. We have proposed withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces; free elections under international supervision; and mixed electoral commissions representing all groups. President Thieu has made clear he will abide by the outcome of elections. He has agreed to meet privately with the NLF and to discuss unifying North and South Vietnam. Unfortunately, the other side so far has not responded positively.

But if a negotiated peace cannot be achieved, we have an alternate route to ending the American combat role. In June of last year, the President announced the policy of Vietnamizing the war, and the first redeployment of United States forces from Vietnam. Vietnamization is a companion to our diplomatic efforts. For the Army, it is now the paramount objective in Southeast Asia.

Vietnamization is the process by which the major military, paramilitary and civil responsibilities that the United States has assumed in South Vietnam are being turned over to the South Vietnamese in an orderly manner and within a reasonable timeframe. Initially in Vietnam operations we perhaps followed too much the natural tendency of Americans to do things for ourselves. We were too slow in training and equipping the South Vietnamese. We have since learned to emphasize those programs which increase the capability of the Vietnamese. For ultimately our whole effort in Vietnam will succeed or fail, depending on what the Vietnamese do—not on what we do.

Vietnamization is more than a military program. The military aspect merely provides a shield behind which the Vietnamese government must come forward with economic, social and political reforms to attract the loyalty and support of the people as a whole. Vietnamization involves helping the Vietnamese people to build their own future—to assure effective internal security forces, a stronger economy, a cohesive society and widened participation in government.

The recent action in Cambodia apparently has been misread by some as an abandonment of Vietnamization and an escalation of our objective to victory in the conventional sense. It is not that at all. It is a limited tactical operation restricted in extent, purpose and time. It is confined to border areas of Cambodia occupied by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong and over which the Government of Cambodia has lost effective control. Its purpose is to destroy stocks and supplies being used in aggression against the Republic of South Vietnam. It will terminate by the end of June.

The operation in Cambodia has not involved any escalation of the level of combat. It is simply the same number of Allied troops fighting the same number of enemy, in a different location where our troops can operate more efficiently and the enemy is much more vulnerable. Far from conflicting with Vietnamization, the removal of the vast Communist stores of weapons and supplies in Cambodia will permit the South Vietnamese sooner to stand without American help.

(Next week: The United States' basic policy of Vietnamization.)

Strength (Or Weakness) Of This Nation Credited To Young Americans In Uniform

(Continued From Page One)

Every human being—alive today, and yet to be born, must place his very existence in the hope of no future World Wars. You know that. But you also know that hope alone will not stave off such a conflagration. If hope were the only need, your organization would have never come into being. You know that strength is the block against such a horror. The strength we had to hurriedly muster in 1917, and again in 1941. The same strength we must keep ready now, in the present; and in the future. Because in this compressed world, timed by a racing clock—we can never again enjoy the luxury of preparing after the threat has been consumated.

. . . My subject is the young American in uniform, and he is the strength of this nation, or the weakness. He is our Armed Forces.

In talking about this young man, this American strength of 1970, I am compelled to make a comparison. With your very kind permission, I would like to compare him with you.

In the two World Wars of this century, the young men who chose service or accepted induction into the Armed Forces did so under an entirely different set of circumstances than do the young men of today. Those young men, and I'm speaking of you, all came to the service for different personal reasons, but you all shared a feeling of the duty-of-citizenship to serve. So do the young Americans of today. But I think you will all agree that duty-of-citizenship was an inviolable virtue in those days. Being a Marine, or a Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Coast Guardsman in World Wars I and II put a man on a pedestal.

You deserved that elevated position. You entered a small, cadre-armed service. In two wars you filled out its strength, matched its professionalism, and raised it to new heights.

When our services today teach recruits of the exploits of American fighting men at Valley Forge, Fort McHenry, Gettysburg, Mobile Bay, Manila, and San Juan Hill—they are impressed. They regard these traditions as high and holy things, but they don't actually relate themselves to those men. Tell them of Belleau Wood, Pearl Harbor, Bastogne, and Iwo Jima, and they will react. These traditions they understand. By choice, it is your footsteps in which they follow.

Much is being said about the present generation of Americans. Depending on who speaks the words, and why they are spoken—they either praise or condemn. But they all seem to point to one generally accepted theory: this generation has abandoned the old values and morals of our past.

In the fact of this theory *I* dissent. It is not true. As a close observer of young Americans in uniform today, I emphatically deny such an idea.

It is understandable how this theory has taken root. Our current public attention is daily forcibly centered on a small minority of what is termed "the turned on, dropped-out generation." This noisy group, because it promises shock-entertainment, has captured the eyes and ears of our news media. From a small, rock-hard establishment of hatred and contempt—an establishment which itself will tolerate no inner dissent—the cry is "down with the establishment." Looking alike in costumes and hair covered faces—and conforming to a demanding, all encompassing code, they shout: "we will not conform."

They have made a collective vow, and they make a collective effort toward individualism.

But the true, young individualist is found in the quiet majority of this generation. The young man who chooses to serve.

From the very beginning of his military service this young man has made a decision, individually, against the intimidation of screaming, hate-filled crowds—or a compulsion to conform. When he enters the service he is not simply fulfilling a duty-of-citizenship. Bombarded by anti-military dialogue, and presented daily examples of evasion of obligation—his enlistment or acceptance of induction is not a popular act of conformity, it is an act of faith. It is an act of faith in those old values and morals for which you fought—it is an act of faith in you.

And it is an act of hope in his own future as a free American. In spite of the popular negativism of today, the *American Dream* still exists. And it finds no greater substance than in the dedication and sacrifice of the young American fighting man.

In 1970-America we face a long roster of national problems. And in the midst of these internal problems, we are at war. We have, for more than a half-decade, been engaged in a hard and bitter conflict. It is, and I quote from the American news media, an "unpopular war."

Has any war ever really been popular? Did any of you who fought, or you who waited, find the agony and sacrifice of the World Wars popular? No, of course not. The men who must bear the burden of combat, who must face possible death—and the loved ones who must wait—never find war popular. But you did feel the support of your people. You did know your service was not in vain.

But this is not World War I, or is it World War II. This is the Vietnam War, and somehow, in the national dialogue, it has become the cause of every problem we face—from social ills to air pollution. And in that same dialogue, the young Americans who serve willingly, perform their duty, and honor their country have assumed the roles of brutal tools of imperialistic oppression. At best they are labeled unthinking dupes, mindless victims of the military industrial complex who must be reeducated and reoriented.

Now some of this is stated in just such ridiculous terms. But it comes in other forms, too. Eloquent and brilliant, it is presented in subtle text that forgoes the arguments of prosecution, for carefully placed resumptions of guilt.

There is a danger in this, a real danger of cutting off the American fighting man from the people he serves. And in this is the real dishonor and disservice of our time.

Not too many years ago there was a popular term—"credibility gap." It was applied to describe any unmeasured distance between official pronouncement and editorial conclusion. Well, I'm afraid there is now a new credibility gap—between what

(Continued On Next Page)

Strength (Or Weakness) Of This Nation Credited To Young Americans In Uniform

(Continued From Preceding Page)

happens at the troop level in the Armed Forces, and what is presumed to happen.

No one is more aware of the credibility gap of 1970 than the American fighting man. This young man—private, non-commissioned officer, or officer—reads, listens and wonders.

Sometimes, because his real world consists of only those around him—men he can see, men he knows he can depend upon—he not only rejects the hyperbole he reads, he pulls even harder into the family circle of his unit.

To a young man far from home fighting for his life, values become crystal clear. What does an editorial on the new morality mean to a man who has just seen a good friend lose his leg to a North Vietnamese mine? Who really cares that the lieutenant was killed—not just another name to write on a slip of paper and drop in a casket—but a good man with personal convictions. A man who loved and served his country.

And worse than death, what of the Americans who are held prisoner in North Vietnam, and in the North Vietnamese jungle camps in Laos or Cambodia? Who cares? He cares, ladies and gentlemen, and sometimes he feels very much alone. That is the real isolation of the American fighting man.

This rugged individualist, this present strength of America, this hope of our future is your Armed Forces. He serves you in courage, dedication, and sacrifice. And yet he is a young man cut from the over-all fabric of this country. He is a part of the heart of this nation—and he has a heart, too. And I don't wonder that it troubles him.

This young American has been brought up in a pronounced doctrine of "win the hearts and minds of the people. Prove your trust." He has done this, time and time again. He has offered his own heart, his own mind, and his precious life for the people he serves, only to sometimes be ignored and even rejected back here in the United States—his homeland.

This is the strength of your country. . . . The spirit of the men who wear the uniform of this country—*your* country. Don't let it be buried in the vicious polemics of this time, of this period of trial.

This war, as all others, will end. But the spirit of the men —the young American fighting men—who are serving you, can't be denied.

W. G. Martin is a veteran of the First World War, and a veteran teacher. He is now well over 80, Dean Emeritus of Schriener College in Texas. Many years ago, in describing the dedication and sacrifice of the young men he had served with in World I, he said:

"Heroism In Warfare Is Like A Ray Of Sunshine Playing Upon A Sea Of Blood And Tears."

I can think of no better description for the young Americans serving in our Armed Forces in this year of 1970. Their heroism is the ray of sunshine in this land. Their heroism is our strength.



AIR FORCE MUSEUM TO HAVE A NEW HOME—An Air Force-wide volunteer fund raising effort in support of a new $6 million dollar Air Force Museum being built at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, will be conducted during July, 1970. The museum is being built entirely with funds donated to the Air Force Museum Foundation, Inc., by businesses and private citizens. The July campaign will allow military and civilian personnel and members of the Reserve and Air National Guard to have a part in the building of their new museum. Donations can be made to local volunteer fund raising organizations or by direct mail to: Air Force Museum Foundation, Inc., P. O. Box, Air Force One, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433. Construction of the new museum began in April, 1970 and is scheduled for completion early next year. It will be open free to the public in the summer of 1971. The museum will help preserve the Air Force heritage through its displays of historic aircraft and related items from the era of the Wright Brothers to the present day. It's military aviation collection is one of the most extensive in the world.

Armed Forces Voters Day

The Department of Defense has designated Sept. 25, 1970 as "Armed Forces Voters Day." The special day was set in accordance with DoD Directive 1000.4, dated Sept. 25, 1965 and DoD Instruction 1000.5, dated Nov. 5, 1963. Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard recently sent the following memorandum to Secretaries of the Military Departments:

I ask that every effort be exerted to insure the success of this special occasion and to make certain that all eligible individuals of the military community are afforded the means by which they may cast their votes, whether at their local polls or by marking absentee ballots here at home or in remote corners of the world.

The right to vote is a product of freedom which was cherished by the American colonists and won in our Revolution. Every eligible citizen has the obligation to express himself through his ballot. We, as members of the United States Armed Forces, should exercise this fundamental right and fulfill our obligations in this important way.

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